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Note
TICHNELL v. STATE-MARYLAND'S DEATH PENALTY: THE
NEED FOR REFORM
The Maryland death penalty statute requires the sentencing au-
thority to consider and to weigh statutorily defined mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances relating to the defendant's background and to
the nature of the criminal conduct.' In Tichnell v. State (Tichnell 1),2
the Court of Appeals, in its first review of a capital sentence imposed
under the 1978 revision of the Maryland death penalty statute, 3 an-
nounced in dictum that the "Maryland statutory scheme for imposition
of the death penalty" was constitutional on its face.4 Specifically, in the
absence of clear statutory direction, the court concluded that the state
bears "the risk of nonpersuasion. . . with respect to whether the aggra-
vating factors outweigh the mitigating factors."5 The court's dictum in
its review of Tichnell's second death sentence (Tichnell I/), 6 however,
suggested that the defendant bears this risk, highlighting practical as
well as constitutional difficulties with the statutory construction in
Tichnell I. The significance of these questions intensifies as the
number of death penalties sought by the state increases.7
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d), (g), (h) (1982).
2. 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tichnelll].
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414 (1982).
4. 287 Md. at 729, 415 A.2d at 848. Because Tichnell's death sentence was vacated and
remanded for resentencing on another ground, see infra note 33 and accompanying text, this
conclusion was unnecessary to the disposition of the case.
5. Id. at 730, 415 A.2d at 849. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
6. In Tichnell 1, Tichnell's death sentence was vacated and the case remanded for a
new sentence. A mandatory review of the second death sentence by the Court of Appeals
followed. Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 61, 427 A.2d 991, 1000 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Tichnell II]. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
7. According to the information compiled by the Maryland Department of Public
Safety and the Correctional Services Bureau of Statistics, as of June 16, 1983 there were 12
persons on death row in Maryland. Statistics compiled by the State Public Defender's Office
indicate that the rate at which State's Attorney's Offices in the twenty-four Maryland juris-
dictions sought the death penalty varies widely. The death penalty is sought in all the quali-
fying cases in one jurisdiction and in none of the qualifying cases in another jurisdiction.
The rate at which the death penalty is actually imposed when sought also varies widely-
from 50% to 0%. Appendix to Supplemental Brief of Appellant at app. 1, Calhoun v. State,
No. 129 Sept. 1981 and No. 5 Sept. 1982. (figures effective Oct. 9, 1981). Although 41 capital
proceedings have been held under the 1978 statute as of June 22, 1983, it is impossible to
compute similar current percentages because figures for the number of qualifying cases in
each jurisdiction are unavailable. Telephone interview with Gary Christopher, Assistant
Public Defender, Maryland State Public Defender's Office (June 22, 1983).
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At the weighing step under the Maryland statute, the standard and
burden pose distinct, albeit related, problems. A strong conceptual link
exists between the burden and standard of proof. Both influence the
probability of the outcome and the risk of error. Nevertheless, it is
helpful, although not always possible, to analyze them separately. This
Note argues that Maryland's ambiguous burden allocation, coupled
with the inadequate standard of proof, increase the risk of error beyond
constitutionally acceptable limits for such a "qualitatively different"
punishment. At the critical final weighing step in capital sentencing,
therefore, the state should bear the burden of proving that the aggra-
vating circumstances outweigh the mitigating beyond a reasonable
doubt. To insure this result, the current statute should be amended
accordingly.
I. THE MARYLAND DEATH PENALTY STATUTE
The development of the Maryland death penalty statute illustrates
the continual efforts of the Court of Appeals and the General Assembly
to comply with the shifting mandates emanating from the Supreme
Court.9 Originally, Maryland's death penalty statute gave the trial
court absolute discretion to impose the death penalty unless the jury
specified "without capital punishment" in the verdict."0 Following
Furman v. Georgia, which appeared to prohibit all sentencing discre-
tion,"I the Court of Appeals struck down that statute, concluding that
8. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
9. Commentators have remarked that the Supreme Court's death penalty opinions re-
flect the Court's efforts to reconcile the competing needs in capital sentencing for both estab-
lished and consistent standards and due regard for the uniqueness of the individual. See
generally Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler
Plate" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 766-76 (1978); Radin,
Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons. Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1143, 1180-85 (1980). But it is impossible to satisfy these two conditions completely yet
simultaneously. "The achievable or imaginable level of individualization varies inversely
with the achievable or imaginable level of consistency." Radin, supra, at 1150 (emphasis
omitted).
10. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1971) (repealed 1975) provided in part:
Every person convicted of murder in the first degree, his or her aiders, abettors and
counsellors, shall suffer death or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary of the State
for the period of their natural life, in the discretion of the court before whom such
person may be tried; provided, however, that the jury in a murder case who render [sic]
a verdict of murder in the first degree, may add thereto the words "without capital
punishment," in which case the sentence of the court shall be imprisonment for life,
For the same provision as applied to rape convictions, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463
(1971) (repealed 1975).
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). See id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J. concurring).
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"the death penalty is unconstitutional when its imposition is not
mandatory."' 2  In response, the General Assembly approved a
mandatory death penalty, which was automatically imposed upon con-
viction of a few narrowly defined first degree murders.' 3 Subsequently,
conforming with Woodson v. North Carolina4 and Roberts v. Louisi-
ana, '5 which held mandatory death sentencing schemes unconstitu-
tional, the Court of Appeals held that Maryland's mandatory statute
was unconstitutional.' 6 The present statute-like those schemes ap-
proved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 7 Proffitt v. Flor-
ida,'8 and Jurek v. Texas 9-provides for: bifurcated proceedings to
determine guilt separately from sentencing,2" establishment of at least
one aggravating circumstance and "weighing" mitigating circum-
stances against aggravating circumstances, 2I and mandatory appellate
review.22
The crux of this scheme is the stage when aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances must be weighed against one another.23 During the
sentencing phase, after the defendant's conviction for first degree mur-
der, the statute directs "the court or jury . . . first [to] consider whether,
beyond a reasonable doubt, any of [ten] aggravating circumstances ex-
ist."2 4 If none exist, the defendant's "sentence shall be imprisonment
for life." 25 Alternatively, if the sentencing authority finds that one or
12. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 184, 297 A.2d 696, 701 (1972).
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1976) (repealed 1978).
14. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
15. 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
16. Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 473, 365 A.2d 545, 549 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
918 (1977).
17. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
18. 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
19. 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion). For critical discussions of Gregg, Proffitt,
Jurek, Woodson, and Roberts, see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63-
76 (1976); Black, Due Processfor Death. Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases, 26 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1 (1976).
20. MD. ANN. CODE an. 27, § 413(a).
21. Id. § 413(d), (f), (h).
22. Id. § 414(a).
23. Id. § 413(h) provides:
(h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances-( 1) If the court or jury finds
that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstances.
(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating cir-
cumstances, the sentence shall be death.
(3) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life.
24. Id. § 413(d).
25. Id. § 413(f).
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more aggravating circumstances exist, it "shall then consider whether
based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any . . . mitigating cir-
cumstances exist."26 Presumably, if no mitigating circumstances exist,
imposition of the death penalty follows automatically. On the other
hand, if any mitigating circumstances are present, the court or jury
"shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mit-
igating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances."27 If
so, "the sentence shall be imprisonment for life."' 28 If not, "the sen-
tence shall be death.- 29 Although the statutory language specifies the
respective standards of proof necessary to establish and to weigh aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, it is silent regarding who bears the
burden of persuasion at each step.
30
II. AMBIGUITY SURROUNDING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Tichnell I
Richard Danny Tichnell was convicted by a jury of wilful, deliber-
ate, and premeditated murder, storehouse breaking, and grand lar-
ceny." After the verdict, Tichnell waived his statutory right to jury
sentencing and the trial court imposed the death sentence on the mur-
der conviction.3 An automatic review by the Court of Appeals
followed.
Although it decided the appeal on other grounds, 33 the court
found that as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, "the State
bears both the risk of nonpersuasion and nonproduction."34 Addition-
ally, the court concluded that the statute "does not require the prosecu-
tion to disprove the existence of mitigation, thus placing on the accused
the risk of nonproduction and nonpersuasion. ' ' 31 Because aggravating
circumstances constitute elements of the offense of capital murder, the
26. Id. § 413(g).
27. Id. § 413(h)(1).
28. Id. § 413(h)(3).
29. Id. § 413(h)(2). According to this language, if mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances are in equipoise, a death sentence results.
30. See Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848.
31. Id. at 699-700, 415 A.2d at 833.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 743-44, 415 A.2d at 855. Ultimately, the court concluded that the death sen-
tence was imposed "under the influence of an 'arbitrary factor'." Tichnell had apparently
relied, in waiving his right to jury sentencing, on a comment made by the trial judge in
chambers. Id.
34. Id. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848.
35. Id.
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first finding is clearly correct.36 Furthermore, the court's second find-
ing seems unassailable under Patterson v. New York, 37 although argua-
bly the defendant should not be required to bear any burdens of proof
in a death penalty case.3" In Patterson, the Supreme Court held that
once the prosecution had proved every fact necessary to constitute the
offense, it was not required to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of every fact constituting a mitigating circumstance or affirm-
ative defense.39 Neither Patterson nor any other Supreme Court case,
however, addressed the procedural issues of whether the defendant or
the state bears the burden of proof in the final weighing step in capital
sentencing and by what standard of proof.'
The Court of Appeals in Tichnell I did consider the burden and
36. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See
infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
37. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
38. The defendant in Lockett v. Ohio raised that issue, but the plurality did not decide it.
438 U.S. 586, 609 n.16 (1978).
39. 432 U.S. at 210. Under a New York statute, a person was guilty of second-degree
murder if he intended to cause, and in fact did cause, the death of another person. Addi-
tionally, a defendant could reduce his crime to manslaughter by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence as an affirmative defense that he "acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance." Because he could not convince the jury that he acted under an
emotional disturbance, Patterson was convicted of second-degree murder. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that New York was simply following the tradi-
tional rule that required the defendant to prove emotional disturbance. Furthermore, dis-
proving the existence of mitigating circumstances "would be too cumbersome, too expensive,
and too inaccurate." Id. at 209.
In his dissent, Justice Powell took a different view of traditional law and noted that
New York's treatment of extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense operated
like the Maine law struck down in Mullaney v. Wilbur, which required a defendant to prove
that he acted in the heat of passion to rebut the presumption of malice. Id. at 220. See infra
notes 101-I1 and accompanying text. As such, the majority's decision was based "on dis-
tinctions in language that are formalistic rather than substantive." Id. at 221. Furthermore,
Justice Powell remarked that the majority's test would allow "a legislature to shift, virtually
at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is
careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor in the statutory language that defines
the crime." Id. at 223. Justice Powell's dissent is persuasive: Mullaney and Patterson have
been called "surprising, if not contradictory." C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 341 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1981).
Thus, under Patterson, a State can require a defendant to prove mitigating circum-
stances which essentially function as affirmative defenses. One significant factor distin-
guishes Patterson and Tichneil I, however. The consequence of proving the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance would have reduced Patterson's prison term by
several years. The consequence of proving mitigating circumstances under the Maryland
statute would mean the difference between life and death.
40. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976), the Supreme Court appeared to ap-
prove implicitly a "clear and convincing" standard. That standard, however, refers to the
degree of certainty the trial judge must attain under the Florida statute to impose death
following the jury's advisory recommendation of life imprisonment.
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standard arising at the weighing stage. Tichnell had argued that the
statute violated due process because it did not require the prosecution
"to assume the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh[ed] mitigating circumstances," 4'
The court concluded that "the statute places the risk of nonpersuasion
on the prosecution with respect to whether the aggravating outweigh
the mitigating" '42 and so met the requirements of due process.
Policy as well as constitutional considerations support this out-
come on the burden issue as the better reading of ambiguous statutory
language. Although the statute does not expressly allocate the burden
of persuasion in the weighing process, the court's construction of this
statutory omission upheld the statute's constitutionality. Additionally,
it was consistent with an overall statutory scheme which, like criminal
law generally, places a heavier burden on the state in capital proceed-
ings. For example, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt both first degree murder and the existence of aggra-
vating circumstances. Furthermore, the state should bear the burden
when it seeks to change the status quo by executing a defendant.43
The court's construction is supported more by sound policy than
by the statutory language. At no point does the statute require the sen-
tencing authority to determine whether the state has proved that aggra-
vating outweigh mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that "[b]ecause the state is attempting to establish that the
imposition of the death penalty is an appropriate sentence, the statute
places the risk of nonpersuasion on the prosecution with respect to
whether the aggravatingfactors outweigh the mitigating factors."44 By
contrast, section 413(h) directs the court or jury to "determine whether
. . . the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances." '45 This language, repeated in other subsections,46 implies that
the defendant, who must prove that mitigating circumstances exist in
the first place, must also show that mitigating outweigh aggravating.
Thus, to reach its conclusion, the court subtly revised the statutory lan-
guage by reversing the order of aggravating and mitigating.
To be sure, courts often manipulate statutory language under the
guise of artful construction to uphold a statute's constitutionality. Nev-
41. 287 Md. at 729, 415 A.2d at 849.
42. Id. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848.
43. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 337.
44. 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at 848.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h).
46. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 413(j)(3), (4), 414 (e)(3); MD. R. P. 772A(d) Section
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ertheless, such tactics can only imperfectly remedy ambiguous lan-
guage. Dictum in Tichnell II illustrates the perils of this strategy.
B. Tichnell II
In Tichnell 11,47 the court reviewed Tichnell's second death sen-
tence and again vacated the death penalty and remanded for resentenc-
ing. Discussing the final step--the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances-the court described a process consistent with
the statutory language but inconsistent with its opinion in Tichnell I:
"To persuade the jury to impose a life rather than a death sentence,
Tichnell wanted to convince it that the mitigating circumstances out-
weighed the aggravating circumstances."" This dictum implies that the
defendant bears the burden of proof, and cannot merely weaken the
state's case, but must show affirmatively that he does not deserve the
death penalty.
Thus, trial courts, attempting to instruct juries or to weigh aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances themselves, must reconcile the in-
compatible language in Tichnell I, which burdens the state, with that in
Tichnell II, which appears to burden the defendant, in the weighing
process. The statute itself, directing the sentencing authority to deter-
mine "whether . . .the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances," supports the dictum in Tichnell I. Although
the better, and constitutional, reading would burden the state, the stat-
utory language, combined with the dicta in Tichnell I and II, foster
ambiguity concerning who bears the risk of nonpersuasion at the final
weighing stage in capital sentencing. Actual practice in death cases in-
dicates that trial courts require the defendant to persuade the sentenc-
ing authority that the nature and quantity of mitigating circumstances
militate against a capital sentence.49
III. PRACTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
STANDARD OF PROOF
Regardless of who bears the burden of persuasion, the standard of
proof specified in the statutory weighing process poses practical diffi-
culties in addition to procedural due process issues. The preliminary
practical, as well as theoretical, problem in the weighing process is that
47. Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. 43, 427 A.2d 991 (1981).
48. Compare 290 Md. at 61,427 A.2d at 1000 with Tichnell 1, 287 Md. at 730, 415 A.2d at
848-49 (Tichnell I apparently burdens the state in the weighing process; Tichnell II indicates
the defendant bears the burden of proof).
49. Telephone interview with Thomas J. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Mary-
land State Public Defender's Office (June 22, 1983).
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the factfinder may weigh the quantity of evidence used to establish the
existence of the circumstances rather than balancing the quality-hei-
nousness or mitigating effect-of those circumstances against each
other.5" If so, it is hard to see how mitigating factors established by a
mere preponderance of the evidence can ever outweigh aggravating cir-
cumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest standard of
proof.51 Another problem is that the factfinder may consider the
number of aggravating circumstances in proportion to the number of
mitigating circumstances. 52 Even assuming that the state bears the bur-
den of proving that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating fac-
tors, such possible faulty applications of the statute increase the
likelihood of a death penalty if the sentencing authority may impose it
merely by finding that it is "as likely as not,"53 or in other words, by a
preponderance, that aggravating outweigh mitigating circumstances.
Theoretically at least, it appears that statutorily defined aggravat-
ing circumstances, established beyond a reasonable doubt, should usu-
ally outweigh mitigating circumstances, established by a mere
preponderance, resulting in an almost automatic death penalty.54 Ob-
viously, this is not the case; the state does not obtain the death penalty
in every prosecution in which it is sought. Even assuming that the
50. "A standard of proof that by its very terms demands consideration of the quantity,
rather than the quality, of the evidence may misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (discussing preponderance of the evidence
standard).
51. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 280 (Utah 1980) (Maughan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing with comment). The Utah statute was silent on both the burden and standard in the
weighing process. The majority reaffirmed that, in capital sentencing, the prosecution bore
the burden of proving that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating, but failed to
elucidate a standard of proof. Id. at 270. Justices Maughan and Stewart assumed that this
lack of specification implied a mere preponderance (the express standard under the Mary-
land statute) and concluded that standard was insufficient to insure due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 272 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
52. In State v. Jones, the prosecution for the Stephanie Ann Roper rape-murder, the jury
concluded that nine mitigating factors were sufficient to outweigh two aggravating circum-
stances. The mitigating circumstances included findings that the defendant was remorseful,
had turned to religion, was unlikely to be a threat to society, was impaired by drugs and
alcohol at the time of the murder, lacked parental guidance, and his execution would cause
suffering to his family. Baltimore Sun, Oct. 16, 1982, at BI, col. 1.
The jury may be less likely to resort to purely mathematical resolution when the
numbers are closer. See Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. at 52, 427 A.2d at 995 (three mitigating
circumstances insufficient to outweigh two aggravating circumstances); Pools v. State, 295
Md. 167, 200, 453 A.2d 1218, 1235 (1983) (Murphy, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (jury
could have concluded that one aggravating circumstance "was not outweighed by the [three]
piddling mitigating circumstances found to exist").
53. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703 (1975).
54. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d at 273-74 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
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factfinder attempts correctly to balance the circumstances, however,
other factors render the decisional process itself problematic.
Realistically, the factfinder does not impose the death penalty in a
vacuum, but carries into the sentencing determination personal values
and opinions concerning, for example, crime and capital punishment.
In addition, in an especially gruesome case, the factfinder may fear the
defendant's possible parole or may respond emotionally to the facts.
Thus, a myriad of factors figure in the ultimate determination of
whether the death penalty is the appropriate punishment." Some of
these factors are inseparable from the sentencing process because the
decision to impose a death sentence is essentially a moral one: "Should
a defendant, who is guilty of murder, live or die for that crime[?]"56
With good reason, the Supreme Court rejected the exercise of unbri-
dled discretion in capital sentencing.57 Nevertheless, it is neither possi-
ble nor desirable to extract totally all moral or value-based elements
from that determination. Whether aggravating circumstances outweigh
mitigating circumstances, rendering the death penalty appropriate, can-
not be determined by the same mental processes or with the same
moral detachment "by which direct and circumstantial evidence are
evaluated for determining such questions as who entered an intersec-
tion first"58 because the moral significance of these determinations is
fundamentally different.
Moreover, the weighing process used to determine a factual propo-
sition does not adapt easily to capital sentencing. For example, to
prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder, the state must
establish, as a matter of fact, that the killing was intentional.59 Usually
the defendant will introduce evidence that the killing was uninten-
tional. All the evidence addresses the same issue-intent. In the sen-
tencing process, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
established in much the same fashion as guilt is determined. When it
weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, however, the sen-
tencing authority contemplates not evidence relating to the same issue,
but diverse and unrelated facts.
The youth of the defendant, or the lack of prior criminal activity,
cannot be "weighed" in any meaningful sense against the aggra-
55. Prosecutorial discretion in the initial decision to seek the death penalty is one factor.
See supra note 7. Additionally, the relative quality of the prosecution and defense counsel
may influence the outcome. See News American, Feb. 4, 1983 at IA.
56. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d at 275 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
58. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d at 275 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
59. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1982).
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vating facts. How does one find that the "fact" that the age of the
defendant, whether 18 or 30 years, does or does not preponderate
against an aggravating circumstance? How does one make such a
determination if the defendant had a shoplifting conviction or em-
bezzlement conviction ten years previous to the murder? To speak
of weighing those factors against the aggravating circumstances is
to employ an appealing but meaningless metaphor which in fact
gives the mind no guidance in resolution of such an overwhelm-
ingly important question.6°
Thus, statutorily prescribed safeguards, as a practical matter, can
only imperfectly focus, and not eliminate preexisting discretion in capi-
tal sentencing. Moreover, conceptual difficulties preclude balancing di-
verse and unrelated facts in a truly meaningful and accurate way.
Although eliminating discretion from capital sentencing is impossible,
guiding and limiting discretion to the maximum possible extent is an
attainable goal of capital statutes. In the context of capital sentencing,
requiring the aggravating to outweigh the mitigating circumstances be-
yond a reasonable doubt would most effectively limit the factfinder's
discretion, a limitation constitutionally required under Furman v. Geor-
gia. 6  Further, that standard would most clearly convey the impor-
tance of insuring that the totality of the aggravating circumstances so
overwhelm the mitigating circumstances as to compel the conclusion
that the death penalty is appropriate. Analysis of analogous Supreme
Court cases suggests that optimum assurance that the death penalty is
appropriate is not only desirable, but constitutionally required.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
In Gardner v. Florida ,62 a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court
found that sentencing procedures in a capital case "must satisfy the
requirements of the Due Process Clause. ' ' 63 Although primarily focus-
ing on the defendant's inability to confront and to discredit an undis-
closed report, 64 the Court also recognized a fundamental difference
between the death penalty and other punishments 65 and that "the sov-
ereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically
from any other legitimate state action."'66 A correspondingly higher de-
60. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d at 275 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
62. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
63. Id. at 358. See also Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (death sentencing
proceeding like trial on question of guilt or innocence).
64. Id. at 356.
65. Id. at 357.
66. Id. at 357-58.
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mand for sentencing reliability accompanies these qualitative differ-
ences.67 Gardner creates a bridge between the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Although the death penalty may not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment per se for the crime of first degree murder,6" insuf-
ficient procedural safeguards in a capital case may transform that sen-
tence into a deprivation of life without due process.
69
Since Gardner, the Court has heightened its scrutiny of capital
proceedings under the due process clause and has demanded that state
supreme courts do the same.70 Although the Supreme Court has never
articulated expressly the standard of "super due process" for capital
punishment, courts do employ such a process. 7 Therefore, Supreme
Court decisions on burden and standard of proof issues in non-capital
sentencing proceedings and other contexts represent minimum proce-
dural safeguards illustrative but not dispositive in capital sentencing.
A. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Mathews v. Eldridge,72 a recipient of Social Security disability
benefits challenged on due process grounds the termination of those
benefits without prior evidentiary hearing. Deciding that an eviden-
tiary hearing was not required,73 the Supreme Court concluded that
whether any procedure is constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of
three specific factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
67. See id. at 359; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion of Stewart, J.).
68. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
69. Compare plurality opinion of Justice Stevens in Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358 ("it is now
clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause") with Justice Rehnquist's dissent, id. at 371 (use of particular sen-
tencing procedures in death case, never previously found to violate due process, cannot con-
vert death sentence into a cruel and unusual punishment).
70. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer may not refuse to con-
sider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence such as family history and emo-
tional disturbance); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (double jeopardy prohibited
death sentence at second sentencing proceeding after jury had sentenced defendant to life
imprisonment at first proceeding); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (death penalty may
not be imposed when jury, in returning a guilty verdict for a capital offense, was not allowed
to consider a lesser included offense); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (statutorily defined aggravating circumstance must not be so broadly and vaguely
worded as to promote discriminatory and standardless sentencing); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) and Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(sentencer cannot be precluded from considering any evidence as a mitigating
circumstance).
71. See Radin, supra note 9, at 1143.
72. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
73. Id. at 349.
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second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.14
In subsequent cases, the Court established that these three factors
must be balanced to determine the appropriate standard of proof under
the due process clause." Analysis of these factors in the context of
capital sentencing suggests that only the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof is sufficient at the final weighing stage.
1. Private Interests-Whether the threatened loss deserves nearly
absolute certainty from the factfinder prior to deprivation depends "on
both the nature of the private interest threatened and the permanency
of the threatened loss."76 Obviously, the defendant sentenced to death
is "condemned to suffer [a] grievous loss."" The Supreme Court has
recognized consistently that "death is a different kind of punishment
from any other which may be imposed in this country. . . . From the
point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its
finality."78 Because the potential deprivation is singularly enormous
and irreversible, a defendant's interest in his life is even more compel-
ling than his liberty or property interests.
74. Id. at 335. The specific outcome in a given case may be difficult to predict using this
test. First, it is impossible to predict the results of a "balancing test" without knowing the
personal values of those doing the balancing. In addition, this method of due process is
functional and thus case specific rather than systematic. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-03 (1978). But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
757 (1982) ("IT]his Court never has approved case-by-case determination of the proper stan-
dard ofproof. Standards of proof. . . 'are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.'" (emphasis in
original)).
75. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1977); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
754 (1982) ("[T]he Court has engaged in a straightforward consideration of the factors iden-
tified in Eldridge to determine whether a particular standard of proof in a particular pro-
ceeding satisfies due process.").
76. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 758.
77. Id., citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. at 357 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); See also Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 117-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
at 604 (plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 586, 598 (1977) (plural-
ity); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); Woodson v. North




2. Risk of Error-The probability of error is anticipated in any
civil or criminal lawsuit, and implicates both individual and societal
interests.79 The different standards of proof symbolize the relative soci-
etal value of these interests and communicate to the factfinder, albeit
with quantitative imprecision, the degree of confidence that he must
have in his conclusion.8" Furthermore, "[t]he standard serves to allo-
cate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative
importance attached to the ultimate decision."'" The preponderance of
the evidence standard employed in most civil cases requires merely the
belief "that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexis-
tence"82 and reflects society's belief that occasional mistaken judgments
for plaintiffs are no worse than occasional mistaken judgments for de-
fendants.83 Because society is only minimally concerned with the out-
come, the parties share the risk of error nearly equally. 4 On the other
hand, demanding proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt represents
societal recognition of the intensity of the criminal defendant's interests
in his life or liberty." As such, that standard signifies society's efforts
to exclude the risk of infringing erroneously on those individual inter-
ests by imposing almost the entire risk of error on the prosecution.86
"The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the
risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly
greater than any possible harm to the state." '87
In a death penalty case, the already existing conviction of first de-
79. See e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). See generally C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 39, at §§ 339, 341 (discussing standard formulations of the burden of
persuasion).
80. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring).
81. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
82. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring), quoting F. JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 250-51 (1965).
83. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
84. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423.
85. The demand for a higher degree of proof in criminal cases has existed since ancient
times, but the specific "beyond a reasonable doubt" language did not occur until 1798. C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 341.
86. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423-24. The intermediate clear and convincing
standard indicates a sufficiently compelling societal interest to warrant surer protection
against erroneous infringement than that provided by the preponderance standard but not
so compelling an interest as to demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. at 769-70 (permanent termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. at 431-32 (involuntary civil commitment); Woodby v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118
(1943) (denaturalization). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 340 (discussing clear
and convincing standard).
87. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 427, quoted in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 768.
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gree murder, established beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot minimize
the risk at the weighing stage. Several aspects of the statutorily pre-
scribed bifurcated proceedings illustrate the separate nature of the con-
viction and sentencing stages. Although some evidence presented at
trial may relate to sentencing, additional evidence distinctly relevant to
sentencing, such as mitigating circumstances, is usually presented at the
sentencing stage.88 Also, the sentencing authority may be a different
entity than the factfinder at trial.89 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
guilt at one proceeding may have no effect on a different factfinder's
certainty of different evidence in a separate proceeding. Additionally,
conviction of first degree murder is a necessary but insufficient prereq-
uisite for the death penalty9" because the state seeks to punish not just
intentional killing, but the heinousness of that killing. To obtain a cap-
ital sentence, the prosecution must prove aggravating circumstances in
addition to the elements of first degree murder. The separate sentenc-
ing proceeding recognizes the creation of a new risk, the risk of convic-
tion of capital murder. Thus, the reasonable doubt standard already in
place at the conviction stage cannot extend protection against error at
the separate sentencing stage.9'
Other factors that figure in any risk analysis are the severity and
the irreversibility of erroneous deprivation.92 Obviously, the death
penalty is in a class by itself in those terms. Furthermore, although a
death penalty is probably more intently scrutinized for error on appel-
late review than a prison term, errors or new evidence can materialize
after appellate review. The incarcerated defendant can be released
once error is established. Life, unlike liberty, cannot be restored.
3. Governmental Interests-In criminal cases, capital punishment
furthers societal interests in deterrance of future crimes and symbolic
88. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(c)(1).
89. Id. § 413(b).
90. Id. § 412(b).
91. Similarly, other protections, such as the rights to counsel and to confront witnesses,
rules of evidence, and appellate review cannot compensate for an inadequate standard of
proof. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 757-58 n.9, where the majority rejected the
appeal to evaluate the constitutionality of New York's statutory procedures for terminating
parental rights as a "package," and remarked "[i]n the criminal context, . . . the Court has
never assumed that 'strict substantive standards or special procedures compensate for a
lower burden of proof .... .' See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
74, at 503-04 ("Perhaps the most important safeguard which is implied by the due process
clause in criminal trials is the requirement that no one be found guilty of a criminal offense
unless the charge has been proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
92. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 758-59.
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compensation for the victim and the community. 93 Capital punishment
accomplishes the latter purpose, retribution, by taking the defendant's
life for the victim's. But, society seeks not only to punish the guilty but
to protect the innocent. Justice Harlan presumed a fundamental socie-
tal value "that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free." 94 Although this assertion may not reflect current
popular sentiment, surely society would only sanction a death sentence
imposed under rigorous and reliable procedures designed to ensure
that death was warranted in a given case. The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof would respect society's deterrent and retribu-
tive purposes and foster its confidence that the ultimate criminal pen-
alty was imposed justly.95
In addition, the government has a legitimate interest in avoiding
the administrative and fiscal burdens that usually accompany addi-
tional or substitute procedures. 96 Fiscal concerns are more defensible
when the issue is whether an additional procedural safeguard is re-
quired at all than when a procedure is already in place and the sole
question is the appropriate standard of proof.97 In the latter case, the
only possible increased cost to the state is that of producing more evi-
dence to prove that aggravating outweigh mitigating circumstances.
Even this increase need not be substantial, however, because the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard reflects the trier's subjective belief in
the correctness of his conclusions rather than the quantum of evi-
dence.98 Thus, "a stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error
without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State." 99 Admin-
istrative burdens would be similarly unaffected. Trial courts are exper-
ienced in applying and instructing juries in applying the different
standards of proof to different facts depending on the nature of the
case."°° Finally, a strongly analogous non-capital sentencing Supreme
Court decision illustrates the conceptual link between the burden and
standard of proof and compels the conclusion that, to impose the death
penalty, the prosecution should bear the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the miti-
gating circumstances.
93. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183. See Liebman & Shepard, supra note 9, at 767.
94. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 363-64.
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 347-48.
97. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 767.
98. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 339.




B. Mullaney v. Wilbur
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,' °1 the Court reaffirmed the constitutional
demand, first articulated in In re Winsh/p, 2 that the prosecution prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a criminal offense. Under
Maine law, to reduce his conviction from murder to manslaughter, de-
fendant Wilbur needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation and so rebut
the presumption that he acted with malice aforethought. The defend-
ant argued that because malice aforethought was an essential element
of murder, and the sole distinction between murder and manslaughter,
he could not be convicted under a presumption of implied malice or be
required to negate malice by proving that he acted in the heat of pas-
sion on sudden provocation. 103 The state contended that In re Winshp
applied only to "fact[s] necessary to constitute the crime"'" and not to
an issue implicated only after the prosecution had already established
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of at least
manslaughter. ,05
Flatly rejecting the state's formalistic interpretation of Winshp,
the Court recognized that criminal justice is "concerned not only with
guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal
culpability."' The Court refused to limit Winshp to its facts, and so
to allow a state to circumvent the due process protections under Win-
shp by redefining the elements of a crime as factors relating solely to
the issue of punishment. 07 Furthermore, by affirmatively shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant, the state had increased the risk of
erroneous conviction.'0 8 If the defendant failed to establish heat of
passion by a preponderance, he could be sentenced for murder even
though "the evidence indicate[d] that it [was] as likely as not that he
deserve[d] a significantly lesser sentence."' 9
The fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict of
murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter, differ signifi-
cantly. Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential difference in
restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the
distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaugh-
101. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
102. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
103. 421 U.S. at 687.
104. Id. at 697.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 697-98.
107. Id. at 698, 700.
108. Id. at 701.
109. Id. at 703 (emphasis in original).
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ter may be of greater importance than the difference between guilt
or innocence for many lesser crimes.I,
Thus, the Court held that due process required the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion on sudden
provocation once the defendant had raised the issue."'
Strong analogies exist between the situations under Maine law in
Mullaney v. Wilbur and under the Maryland death penalty statute con-
strued in TichnellI and I. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, proving manslaugh-
ter-that the killing was unlawful and intentional-was the
preliminary requirement for proving murder." 2 Similarly, proving
first degree murder was, and is, the preliminary requirement for capital
murder under the Maryland death penalty statute.1 1 3 As to these con-
victions, the prosecution bore the burden of proving all the elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In both cases, however, an addi-
tional "element" was necessary to escalate the offense, thus advancing
the degree of criminal culpability. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme
Court struck down a state law that required a defendant to rebut the
presumption of malice by proving a fact-heat of passion on sudden
provocation-by a preponderance of the evidence. Apparently, under
Tichnell II and perhaps the statute itself, to escape the death penalty,
the Maryland defendant must prove that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances by a preponderance.' Wil-
bur needed to reduce his offense from murder to manslaughter;
Tichnell needed to reduce his offense from capital to first degree
murder.
Under the Maryland statute, this final step, the weighing process,
operates as a critical and dispositive element in capital murder. To
relegate the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating
circumstances to a mere punishment issue ignores the significant differ-
ences in the resulting consequences between first degree and capital
murder." 5 The distinction between life imprisonment and the death
I 10. Id. at 698.
1i1. Id. at 704. By framing the holding in the negative, the Court appeared to defer to
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state homicide law. Because that con-
struction allowed the prosecution to rest on a presumption of implied malice aforethought,
the Supreme Court did not demand that the prosecution prove malice beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 688, 690-91.
112. Id. at 685.
113. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(a).
114. Tichnell v. State, 290 Md. at 61, 427 A.2d at 1000; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h).
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
115. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 698 (significant differences between conviction
of murder and manslaughter).
19831
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
penalty is obviously "of greater importance than the difference between
guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes." ' 6 Furthermore, under the
statutory preponderance of the evidence standard at the weighing
stage, the defendant can be sentenced to death even though the evi-
dence indicated that it was as likely as not that he deserved life
imprisonment. "17
V. CONCLUSION
To pass constitutional muster under Mul/aney, the state should
bear the burden of proving that the aggravating outweigh the mitigat-
ing circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt because that element is6necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
charged,"" 8 namely capital murder. To ensure this result, the Court of
Appeals should clarify definitively that it meant what it said in Tichnell
I-that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. Unfortunately, this
judicial remedy is destined to inadequacy. First, it cannot prevent a
later court from reading the ambiguous statutory language requiring
that the "mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum-
stances" "9 to burden the defendant. More important, the court cannot
construe away the constitutionally deficient preponderance of the evi-
dence standard the statute expressly provides for the weighing process.
Thus, courts and juries will continue to determine, by a mere prepon-
derance, whether death is appropriate in a given case. The General
Assembly could more effectively eliminate the existing ambiguity and
inadequacy by amending the statute to provide that in the weighing
process, the state shall bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances.
Commentators have advanced numerous arguments to abolish the
death penalty. Most posit that capital punishment is morally offensive
and unlikely to deter future capital felonies.' 20 Despite well-founded
116. Id.
117. Id. at 703. See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 39, at § 339 (discussing formula-
tions of the preponderance standard).
118. In re Winship 397 U.S. at 364, quoted in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 697.
119. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h).
120. See generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
AND MISTAKE (1981) (inevitability of arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty
renders it an unlikely deterrent). For a discussion of the difficulties in assessing the deterrent
effect of the death penalty, see T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980). Contra F. CAR-
RINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL (1978).
On a more practical note, states incur enormous financial costs to impose the death
[VOL. 42
REVISING DEATH PENALTY
reasons for that view, capital punishment appears to be a permanent
fixture in most American jurisdictions,' 21 especially since the Supreme
Court apparently has concluded that the death penalty is not per se
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 22
Nevertheless, unreliable or ineffective capital sentencing procedures,
because they increase the risk of error and inadequately protect the
defendant's interests, may violate due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment.123 In the context of the death penalty the standard
of proof functions as more than an academic exercise. Its practical
value at minimizing risk is obvious where, as in Winship, a trial judge's
ability to distinguish between the two standards enabled him to make a
finding by a preponderance that he might not have made beyond a
reasonable doubt. 124 Symbolically, the reasonable doubt standard in-
dicates society's cognizance of the moral significance of the death pen-
alty and its demand that the ultimate criminal sanction be imposed
under the most exacting degree of factual certainty that minimizes the
risk of error and the appearance of arbitrariness. 125
penalty. State tax dollars finance the prosecution, usually the defendant's representation by
the public defender, mandatory appellate review, and resentencing proceedings for each
case. In a death penalty case, the average defense alone costs about $100,000. Baltimore
Sun, Apr. 21, 1982, at D11, col. 1. Despite these expenditures, the last Maryland execution
was in 1961. Baltimore Sun, Nov. 28, 1982, at Al, col. 3.
121. Thirty-seven states and the federal government have enacted capital punishment
statutes. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN No. NCJ-89395
(July 1983).
122. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 168-69.
123. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349; supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
124. 397 U.S. at 367. But see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 424 ("[Elfforts to analyze
what lay jurors understand concerning the differences among these three tests or the nuance
of a judge's instructions on the law may well be largely an academic exercise .... ").
125. For a discussion of another method of reducing arbitrariness in capital sentencing,
see Note, The Bitter Fruit of McGautha: Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Needfor Weighing
MethodArticulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 63 (1982), which urges that
capital sentencers be required to articulate explicitly on the record their methods of weigh-
ing each aggravating and mitigating circumstance.
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